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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
It should not be inferred that the trial court's opinion would not
have been valid if management had sought the order of replevin. That
is the type of action which would circumvent the intention of the
Legislature in adopting section 807 of the Labor Law.20 4 No such cir-
cumvention is accomplished by allowing a non-party to the dispute to
obtain an order of seizure.
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: Arbitration clauses construed.
Because of the very nature of the arbitral process, those contractual
stipulations which give rise to the arbitration cannot be overempha-
sized. In innumerable situations which have had profound effects upon
the development of "arbitration law," the paramount question has
been the meaning of the arbitration clause, with the result that the
breadth of the arbitration clause is proportionate to the scope of judi-
cial inquiry. Although New York has abandoned the "bona fide" dis-
pute rule,2 5 the anterior question remains: Is "the party seeking
arbitration making a claim which on its face is governed by the con-
tract[?]" '206
Two recent New York decisions have dealt with this threshold
question and, in the process, have underscored the significance of the
arbitration clause itself.
In Steinberg v. Steinberg,207 the plaintiffs submitted a demand
which, inter alia, stated that the defendants had wrongfully instituted
a prior arbitration proceeding, but the court correctly noted that
the tortious use of the arbitral process or other tort committed in
connection with the maintenance of the prior arbitration proceed-
204 The provisions of the statute indicate that it does not encompass action by a non-
party to the dispute. For example, subsection (4) states that
[n]o injunctive relief shall be granted to any plaintiff... who has failed to allege
and prove that he has made every reasonable effort to settle such dispute....
N.Y. Lnor LA%w § 807(4) (McKinney 1965). An individual who is not involved in the dis-
pute certainly would not be expected to take such action. Cf. Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v.
Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E2d 280, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 774, rehearing denied, 320 U.S.
811 (1943); Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salemen's Union Local 1115F, 177 Misc. 708,
31 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
205 The Cutler-Hammer doctrine provided that a judicial determination that the dis-
pute in question was viable was a prerequisite to compelling arbitration. Roundly criti-
cized, this doctrine has been vitiated by the last line of CPLR 7501: "[T]he court shall
not consider whether the claim with respect to which the arbitration is sought is tenable,
or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."
200 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See
also Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n v. Conrad, 18 App. Div. 2d 321, 239 N.Y.S.2d 241
(4th Dep't 1963).
207 38 App. Div. 2d 57, 327 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Ist Dep't 1971).
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ing is not embraced within the proper intendment of the arbitra-
tion clauses. 208
Of course, if the arbitration clause expressly provides for such claims,
they will be allowed; but absent an express inclusion, the arbitral pro-
cess would be an unending one if such claims were permitted. If the
plaintiff were successful in bringing to arbitration such a dispute, there
would be little doubt that another proceeding would subsequently be
initiated by the prior defendant on the same grounds.
The second decision, Hull Dye & Print Works, Inc. v. Riegel Tex-
tile Corp.,209 involved an arbitration clause which stated, in part, that
[a]ny controversy arising under or in relation to the contract or any
modification thereof may be settled by arbitration or by suit in any
court having jurisdiction, as the Mill [Hull] shall direct. 210
On the basis of the clause, Riegel attempted to compel arbitration.
The court noted, however, that the phraseology employed in the arbi-
tration clause clearly indicated that only Hull was to have the option
of proceeding to arbitration or instituting litigation:
The clause.., is not a contract for arbitration of controversies but
rather a grant to Hull of a unilateral right to arbitrate. Neither
party is required to arbitrate.21 '
As noted at the outset, both Steinberg and Hull demonstrate the
importance of the arbitration clause itself. They should serve as re-
minders to the practitioner that careful analysis of the wording em-
ployed in the clauses will often be outcome-determinative.
CPLR 7501: Arbitration stayed without prejudice where notice of in-
tention to arbitrate did not specify the nature of the controversy.
CPLR 7501 provides for the specific enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate "without regard to the justiciable character of the contro-
versy," thus precluding the court from passing upon the merits of the
dispute. An application to compel arbitration may be opposed on only
three grounds: (1) absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) non-
compliance with an agreement; (3) tolling of the state of limitations.212
Unless one of the above grounds is established, arbitration must be
ordered.
208 Id. at 59, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
209 37 App. Div. 2d 946, 325 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Ist Dep't 1971) (per curiam).
210 Id. at 946, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
211 Id.
212 H. WACHITELL, NEW YORK PRACriCE UNDER THE CPLR 370 (3d ed. 1970). See Greene
Steel & Wire Co. v. F.W. Hartmann & Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962),
aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 683, 247 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 14 N.Y.2d 688,
198 N.E2d 914, 249 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1964).
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